biography . ... , while it is cited substantially less frequently by psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, and literary scholars" (Runyan, 1988b, p. 15) .
The Georges' approach revolves around the fundamental psychoanalytic concepts of self-esteem and repression: "The basic hypothesis," the Georges write, "concerning the dynamics of Wilson's political behavior is that power was for him a compensatory value, a means of restoring the self-esteem damaged in childhood [by his demanding and perfectionistic father] . . . his desire for power was mitigated by a simultaneous need for approval, respect, and, especially, for feeling virtuous" (George & George, 1956 , p. 320; see also, p. 114. The Lasswellian influence is plain here-cf. Lasswell, 1930; 1948) . Leadership was for Wilson, that "sphere of authority in which he sought compensatory gratifications" (1964; p. 115; see also p. 117). Furthermore, His ster Calvinist conscience forbade an unabashed pursuit or use of power for personal gratification. He could express his desire for power only insofar as he convincingly rationalized it in terms of altruistic service, and fused it with laudable social objectives. .. To convince himself of the reality of his selfless motivation, he must painstakingly carve out a sphere of competence, within which he must perform good works. (1956, p. 117; also, A. George, 1968) From this starting point, the Georges extended their analysis to attempt to "identify the specific types of situations in which [Wilson's] behavior was narrowly circumscribed in range and flexibility" (1956, p. 317). It is here particularly that their analysis-whatever one's assessment of its validity-gains its elegance:
... it is necessary to distinguish Wilson the power-seeker from Wilson the powerholder. Once he had rationalized his desire for office in terms of unselfish service to others, Wilson the power-seeker was free to devote every ounce of his intelligence and energy to waging a realistic campaign to attain his goal. For the personal gratifications he sought-to dominate, to do immortal work, to demonstrate his ability and virtue-could be achieved only if he first obtained a specific position of power. . . . However, having attained an opportunity for exercise of power, first as President of Princeton and finally as President of the United States, he was no longer able to suppress his inner impulses toward aggressive leadership. (George & George, 1956, p. 116) Thus, the Georges contend, after initial, often stunning success in power-seeking and in the honeymoon phase of office, there followed increasingly autocratic and rigid behavior in the face of the inevitable opposition that arises for any political leader, and especially for one as ambitious in his use of office as was Wilson. For Wilson the power-holder, strong opposition evoked, in the Georges' analysis, his repressed anger at his father's domination of him as a child (George & George, 1956 , pp. 9-10; chapter vii). Thus, Having legitimized his drive to exercise power by laborious self-preparation and by adopting worthy goals, Wilson felt free to indulge his wish to force others into immediate and complete compliance with his demands. . . The extraordinary energy with which he applied himself to the task of making his will prevail was supplied, we suggest, by the pent up aggressive impulses which could find expression at last through his leadership tactics.
This demand, so uncontrollably pressed, for unqualified submission to his leadership lay at the root of the most serious crises of his career. (George & George, 1956, p. 117-118) 
RECEPTIONS, CONTROVERSIES AND CONTENDING INTERPRETATIONS
If the Georges' book itself helped to mark a major step in psychobiography's maturation as a discipline, they were obviously writing at a time when there had been little to demonstrate the power of psychobiography to historians or to anyone else. (William L. Langer's call, in his presidential address to the American Historical Association, to exploit depth psychology in historical research was not made until the year following WWCH's publication in 1956.) The Georges recently recalled the scholarly situation in the following terms: "We knew that such an interpretation would be anathema to many historians. We also knew that a closely guarded manuscript containing Freud's own interpretation of Wilson was in the hands of William Bullitt, that it would one day be published and that we might then find ourselves at embarrassing odds with the master himself" (George & George, 1989b) .
A scan of early reviews shows the work was nevertheless well received, certainly among political scientists (cf. Brodie, 1957) , but also among at least some historians (e.g., Jellison, 1957; Watson, 1957-58) . Over time, criticisms, controversies, and contending interpretations have emerged, some challenging, implicitly or explicitly, the very idea of a psychodynamic approach to Wilson, others disputing some particular biographical or psychobiographical element, and others offering altogether new psychodynamic interpretations. Together, as I hope to demonstrate, these comprise a scholarly legacy of considerable value for furthering our understanding of the limitations and potentials of political psychobiography.
Of all the members of these debates, no more dramatic participant could have presented himself than the already mentioned Arthur S. Link Roazen, 1970, p. 322; and Coles, 1975, pp. 193-195) .
In their essay Link and his coauthors argue that Wilson's childhood was far less traumatic than that pictured by the Georges. They contend that the record reflects a more loving, less ambivalent relationship between Wilson and his father, and that the Georges' psychosomatic hypothesis regarding Wilson's childhood reading difficulties (as an unconscious rebellion against his father) is incorrect, asserting instead a diagnosis of dyslexia in its place. They further contend that Wilson's crisis at Princeton involved, on the one hand, a more rational, political process than is appreciated by the Georges, and on the other, behavioral manifestations of previously undiagnosed strokes. Finally, and most importantly, they feel that likewise the psychological consequences of Wilson's "cerebro vascular disease" explain Wilson's self-defeating behaviors during and after the Paris Peace Conference.
In other words, the psychoanalytically oriented approach to Wilson is refuted at every significant turn, and replaced with other (primarily, physiological) explanations for the behaviors in question. Many elements of the ensuing debates between the Georges and Link et al., as well as with other commentators on Wilson's political personality, speak quite directly to problems of theory and method in political psychobiography, and so merit discussion here. This will be organized around three issues that have dominated the exchanges: the problem of assessing the rationality of specific political behaviors, physiological versus psychological interpretations of irrational behaviors, and contending psychological interpretations of Wilson's personality.
ASSESSING THE RATIONALITY OF WILSON'S POLITICAL BEHAVIOR DURING CRISIS
While the Georges attempt to account for Wilson's personality as a whole, much of their case rests on a view of Wilson as having repeated certain selfdefeating patterns of behavior under certain kinds of environmental stresses throughout his career. Some criticisms of WWCH have attempted to undercut its argument by questioning, in one way or another, the Georges' view that Wilson, despite his considerable intelligence and political skill, at times was dominated by unconscious psychodynamic factors that led to a less than optimally rational response to his situation. (I am not here using rationality and irrationality in a psychologically technical or diagnostic manner, but in the common usage sense of, for instance, the American Heritage Dictionary: Was Wilson acting, at a given time, with his "normal mental clarity" and "in accord with . . . sound judgment"?) Before turning to the Princeton period, the object of greatest contentions in this regard, I will give some smaller examples in which the question of the rationality of particular behaviors has been disputed. The Georges respond to these points by asking how Weinstein, Anderson and Link can contend that Wilson was acting "from a reasonable assessment of the situation" when they are in the act of refuting the theses of WWCH, and then go on to claim that Wilson was during the same period showing behavioral manifestations of "brain damage from the alleged strokes . . ." "To us," they write, "it seems that to the extent that they consider Wilson's refusal to compromise in the [Princeton] . . . battles a reasonable defense of his principles, they reduce the grounds for arguing the significance of the alleged personality and behavioral changes in consequence of the alleged strokes" (George & George, 1981-82, pp. 656-657).
Certainly it is plausible that recent scholarship has added to our understanding of the Princeton period, but as these points have been brought to bear so far they seem to speak more to nuance than to the heart of the Georges' argument about Wilson's personality dynamics at Princeton. For one thing, the presentation in these critiques of the Georges' thesis is somewhat limited, for it is not the essential point in WWCH that Wilson was looking for someone to affix his anger to, and was fabricating issues in order to allow him to do so. It is true that at one point, at least, the Georges use language that is fairly consistent with this formulation: "Here at last was an 'issue,' something which could be turned into a moral crusade of the sort Wilson required as an acceptable rationalization for the expression of his hostile feelings" (1964, p. 40). But, in the context of the chapter as a whole, the Georges are clearly not suggesting a simplistic search for an excuse to vent, but a more complex political-psychological process, the dynamic of which is conveyed very much along the lines of Link's original view that "[Wilson] drove so hard, so flatly refused to delegate authority, and broke with so many friends that when the inevitable reaction set in he was unable to cope with the new situation" (Link, 1947 In any event, one observation that emerges here is that it is harder to arrive at a confident conclusion regarding the rationality or irrationality of a given behavior taken in isolation than it is to do so when viewing a life as a whole and the patterns that emerge from that broadview. That is, it can be argued that "The notion that some sort of dramatic change came over [Wilson] , by reason of illness, or whatever, simply doesn't stand up when you study the man's career, from the beginning until when he left the White House. His consistency is one of the most striking things .. ."(J. George, 1983, interview; see also, George & George, 1956, p. 318). Still, it is possible to retort, as some have, that medical, not psychodynamic, explanations account for Wilson's political lapses through-out his career. As we shall see below, the question that is raised in turn is why would medical factors translate into Wilson's specific pattern of political behaviors.
MEDICAL VERSUS PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR WILSON'S POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
The participants in these debates disagree not only on whether a given political behavior should be viewed as rational or irrational, but on how best to explain the latter. For example, many agree that Wilson was acting with significantly impaired judgment in the aftermath of, and perhaps during certain phases of, the Paris Peace Conference. Fewer, however, agree on why this was so. In the following section, contending psychodynamic interpretations of Wilson will be considered. Here the focus will be on the argument that Wilson's irrational episodes are best explained as manifestations of medical problems, and not, as the Georges contend, in terms of psychodynamic, personality variables.
The The most persuasive and insightful voice in this discussion has been that of Post (1983) , who argues that the psyche and soma perspectives are best viewed as potentially complementary, rather than as necessarily exclusive. Thus, for Post, the question is not whether Wilson's reading difficulties as a child should be attributed to organic dyslexia or to psychodynamic causes, but how, even if one were to accept the dyslexia hypothesis (which Post himself leans toward), it tends to reinforce the Georges' view that Wilson's childhood was one that created in him considerable insecurity and frustration. Thus: "Weinstein grudgingly acknowledges that the reading disability may have led Wilson to fear that he was stupid or lazy and that it probably led Dr. Wilson 'to be more pedagogic and " (1983, p. 314) . Nevertheless, the weight he gives to medical diagnoses as explanatory variables is so substantial, and the psychological dimension of his analysis so "lacks a cohesive unifying theme" (Warner, 1988, p. 488) , that it is fair to view Weinstein on the medical side of the mind-body divide (Post, 1983) . 3For the Georges' defense of their interpretation of Wilson's reading difficulties, see George and George, 1981-82. Also, note that the Georges' thesis was actually originally put forth very much in the manner suggested by Post. That is, it is presented as a possibility, not a certainty, and is followed up by this crucial point: "In any case, the significant fact is that coming from a home in which reading was an important daily activity, Tommy's [young Woodrow's] reading proficiency was retarded; in a home saturated in a religious atmosphere, he had difficulty learning the catechism; in a family of scholars, he was a conspicuously poor student" (1964, p. 7, emphasis added). the utmost urgency and intensity, both politically and psychologically: He was experiencing mass adulation of the most heady sort, and his supreme achievements were within his reach. Yet all of this was occurring at the very moment when the potential for mortality to interfere with life goals and purposes would have been dramatically apparent, by his stroke during the recovery period" and to a "disease-induced accentuation of his personality" (Parks, 1991, pp. 527-528). Such convergence may never be complete, however, for we may well be witness here to that most difficult to resolve of scholarly disputes: clashing worldviews in debate over inherently inconclusive evidence. In any event, it is a debate that echoes quite directly current arguments within both the clinical community and within academia regarding physical versus psychological bases of not only psychopathology but consciousness itself. In this light it is perhaps not surprising that the Wilson Papers addendum quoted above ends with the words, "illness was one of the prime causes of the defeat of the Versailles Treaty" (1991, p. 528).
CONTENDING PSYCHODYNAMIC INTERPRETATIONS OF WILSON'S POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
A further line of debate, rather than challenging a psychodynamic interpretation of Wilson, accepts such a perspective and asks which specific psychodynamic theory to apply.4 As the Freud-Bullitt and Weinstein versions of Wilson have already been discussed, and as the former is so methodologically weak and 4Of course, not all psychobiography need be of the psychodynamic variety (cf. Bruggert, 1981; Runyan, 1988a). But much psychobiography to date does draw on some version of psychoanalytic personality theory, and this is definitely the case for Wilson psychobiographies. On this point, historians have been known to throw up their hands when confronted with the fact that not only do many contending schools of psychology exist, but many contending schools of psychoanalytic/ psychodynamic psychology exist as well. However, as Ross points out, it should be remembered that "the range of difference and convergence [among personality theories] is not unlike that range of difference and convergence between different schools of historical interpretation" (1982, p. 660). theoretically outdated, and the latter is so heavily weighted toward the medical emphasis, they may be set aside for the purposes of the present section. Here, I will restrict myself to commenting on several shorter, but still substantial, treatments representing distinct psychoanalytic schools of thought. As these post-WWCH psychodynamic treatments of Wilson all rest on a reasonably sophisticated base as far as historical methodology and psychological theory goes, they offer the possibility of addressing more subtle issues of political psychobiography than is possible, for instance, in comparing WWCH with Freud-Bullitt.
As a prelude to examining the more purely psychological interpretations of Wilson that have been offered since the publication of WWCH, it is interesting to consider some of the Georges' reflections on their own theoretical choices. Starting with the then available literature on compulsiveness, which seemed to fit Wilson in some respects but which they ultimately found too "static" (George & George, 1964 Without commenting on Ross's counter-diagnosis (which is offered as a footnote, and not developed), the main point here is that the Georges themselves found the formal diagnosis of compulsiveness unsatisfactory and offered instead a "shallow" theoretical stance built on such fundamental psychodynamic concepts as low-self esteem, compensatory behavior, and repressed hostility:
. . ."self" and "self-esteem" are important concepts in all psychodynamic theories.
We did not want to develop a model that lacked discernible links with the available empirical data; hence . . . we were willing to settle for, and in fact preferred, a relatively "shallow" personality model. . . . (George & George, 1989b ; and see A. George, 1968) Although Kohut's work-and even Erikson's-came to prominence only after we had finished our study of Wilson, there certainly were in the late 'forties and 'fifties a number of schools of psychoanalytic thought. ...
What to do? We decided to cast our analysis so far as possible in non-technical language. We were attracted to Lasswell's very general hypothesis of compensatory power-seeking because, for one thing, we felt that it illuminated, and provided a very good empirical fit with, so much of the available biographical material on Wilson. Lasswell's hypothesis also had the virtue of cutting across and being at least compatible with many systems of psychoanalytic thought. . . . Our hope was that we could present the historical data . . . in such a way that proponents of the various "schools" of analysis would have the salient available data at their disposal and could, if they wished, supply more technical interpretations in their own preferred theoretical terms. (J. George, 1987; see also A. George, 1971) Given the use of broad and basic psychoanalytic constructs (such as "selfesteem") and the choice of a "shallow" personality model (which assumes that it is not necessary to have insight into the most buried and primitive layers of Wilson's unconscious in order to sufficiently understand his political dynamics), it is not surprising that the Georges' analysis has helped inspire a series of further interpretations of Wilson based on more specific theoretical perspectives.
For 
updating (whether an improvement has taken place is a more complex question to which we will return) consider Bongiomo's Kohutian recasting of Wilson's relationship with his father: One major question is the meaning of the obvious idealization [Wilson had for his father].
The Georges maintain that idealization arose from reaction-formation against his unconscious aggression toward his father. When the Georges wrote their book, this meaning of idealization was almost axiomatic, but idealization is now recognized to have other possible meanings. Woodrow revealed the meaning of his. When he wrote that his father stirred more life into his brain than a whole year's study at John Hopkins, he meant more than intellectual stimulation, he also meant psychical stimulation. His father vitalized him. Woodrow contrasted this to the "narrowed"-less vital, less complete-inner experience he had at other times. (Bongiomo, 1985, p. 162 In the above reformulations, we have shifted out of the historiographical set of debates discussed earlier and into the realm of pure psychodynamic interpretation. These psychobiographical disputes about an ex-president display current paradigmatic tensions within a theoretical community, in this case between the classical, "oedipal level" psychoanalytic orientation represented by the Georges, and more contemporary psychoanalytic conceptualizations and sensibilities, here represented by the application of Kohut. How are we to judge the results of such efforts, and what are their implications for psychobiography?
The Georges feel that efforts to examine their work on Wilson from alternative theoretical perspectives should indicate whether they are attempting, as they put it, (1) to advance alternative hypotheses that are in effect a translation of our non-technical psychodynamic formulations into the more technical language of their particular preferred psychodynamic theory; or (2) to advance alternative hypotheses that add to and enrich our model without undermining it; or-most interesting of all-(3) to invalidate some important part of our model of Wilson's personality, or the entire model, and to argue in behalf 6The Colonel House element of the Georges' book is sometimes dismissed, perhaps because the title suggests a sort of dual psychobiography, while House actually has a much smaller role and is used specifically for his value in understanding Wilson. Two points should be noted here: One is that the main purely historiographical contribution of WWCH was that the Georges were the first to publish certain significant excerpts from the House diaries (George & George, 1981-82, pp. 643-644). And the second is that the relationship is indeed a psychologically rich and suggestive one. For example, the Wilson-House relationship, as depicted in WWCH, is quite evocative of narcissistic personality dynamics as portrayed by such clinical theorists as Kohut (1971) In effect, then, these various theoretical takes on Wilson are an opportunity to not only understand the man but to reflect on the merits of various theoretical stances. In either pursuit, however, a number of points must be kept in mind. The first is that various psychobiographies, even of the same subject, can be serving a number of different scholarly purposes. Thus, as I read the literature, the Georges seem most interested in understanding Wilson psychodynamically and are willing to use whatever theoretical constructs seem to work best. Bongiorno is trained in Kohut's theory, and has already decided which is the most advanced psychological theory, and is using Wilson as an exercise in applied self psychology. Tucker (as is true of myself) is more interested in psychobiography than Wilson per se. (Note that Tucker's piece is subtitled "An Essay on Psychobiography.") All of these are valid, and all are related, but not identical, enterprises.
To complicate matters further, it is probably fair to say that, in addition to scholarly judgment, there are myriad factors that make particular psychological theories "ego-syntonic." (One's mentor is associated with a particular school of thought, it is more affordable or convenient or prestigious to study at one institute rather than another, one's own psychology comes into play, etc.) And even leaving the grosser manifestations of these elements aside, there are subtle ways in which theoretical favoritism can color a particular argument. For example, in Bongiomo's excellent paper, in the several places where he compares oedipal level interpretations to self-psychological ones, it is clear that his scholarly passion is in the latter. The former are not presented in a distorted manner, but they are bland, without creative juice, and this casts a particular tone to the comparison. (See, e.g., Bongioro, 1985, pp. 139-40, 145, 151 , and 162. Compare this to Allison's more wholehearted renditions of three interpretations of the Cuban Missile Crisis-1971).
Also to be borne in mind is that a given scholar's skill at psychobiographical method may obscure his or her use of a weak theory, just as a given scholar's lack of psychobiographical skill may obscure a theory's attributes. Thus, the FreudBullitt Wilson not only displayed some of the weaknesses of classic psychoanalytic theory, it seemed to magnify them as well. The Georges' book, on the other hand, remains useful well beyond Lasswell's historically important, but now somewhat limited, concepts of political personality.
Finally, one other factor suggests itself as deserving reflection when applying new theoretical constructs to earlier ones: In psychodynamic theory, one can plausibly argue that the theory is evolving, and this implies a kind of automatic rationale for re-interpreting phenomena. However, even if, for the sake of argument, we were to accept as a given that Kohut's theory is superior to classical analytic theory, a problem still exists in applying it to a figure like Wilson. As Wheelis explains, "There is. .. This means neither that Freud's theory is meaningless today (his patients weren't of another species) nor that contemporary theory has gained nothing in sophistication as theory, and is simply "different" (today's theorists are operating on a broader base of much more refined and careful developmental and clinical data than Freud had available to him, and it would be an absurdity if there had been no advance, as Freud would surely agree). It does mean that we should be careful when claiming superiority for a newer interpretation, especially for a figure like Wilson, who, it should be remembered, was a contemporary of Freud's, and of the Victorian era, and not a contemporary of ours in our "culture of narcissism" (as Lasch, 1979 The reported increase in the number of narcissistic patients does not necessarily indicate that narcissistic disorders are more common than they used to be, in the population as a whole, or that they have become more common than the classical conversion neuroses. Perhaps they simply come more quickly to psychiatric attention. (Lasch, 1979 , p. 90) I tend to doubt this could be wholly true, but it may be partially so; it is a hard point to determine. If it does represent the better explanation of the changing nature of clinical patients, it would strengthen the argument for a reinterpretation of Wilson based on the clinical perspective of narcissism. In any event, note that psychobiography of public figures of different eras is one of the ways to research this very question, a point to which I'll return in the conclusion. 8It is also the case that our picture of Wilson's father has been fleshed out somewhat by recent scholarship, showing him to have, along with his towering impressive aspect (emphasized by the Georges), his own share of insecurities (Mulder, 1978; Weinstein, 1981) . The point is made in this regard, for example, that the Georges may have been exaggerating to depict Wilson as dependent on his father throughout his life, in that in later life they engaged in something of a role reversal. However, that Wilson's father had strong inner insecurities probably strengthens the Georges' thesis, although it is sometimes claimed to do the opposite (Mulder, 1978, p. 27 original. Post adds to this-reflecting, a contemporary "object relations" orientation, rather than the "drive theory" of classical Freudian analytic thinking-the concept that Wilson was not just reacting against his experience of his father, but was acting out his identification with him (cf. Bongiomo, 1985; and Stem, 1987 " (1983, p. 309) . While, as Post notes, this does not negate the Georges' original formulation, it is actually a significant refinement of it, the implications of which have yet to be fully explicated.
CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing discussion of Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House and the scholarly disputes in which it has played a central role show that productive lines of inquiry can emerge from both the historical and the psychological "wings" of the psychobiographical endeavor: Each can lead to cross-disciplinary tensions and dialogues that can result in progress not only for psychobiography, but potentially as well for history, for psychology, and possibly, by extension, for some current issues in the social sciences more generally. In conclusion I will consider this potential in terms of the agenda that this material suggests for psychobiography.9
History and Psychobiography
Methodologically, weak historical analysis defeats psychobiography, reducing it to little more than a reflection of the theoretical biases, ideology, and/or countertransferences of the writer, or at the very least leaving it too vulnerable to being seen as such. Strong historiography, on the other hand, both disciplines psychobiography and legitimizes it. Thus, whereas the Freud-Bullitt Wilson could be summarily and wholly dismissed on historiographical grounds (Link, 1967; Tuchman, 1981) , WWCH, reflecting a much stronger respect for historical methodology and political context, could only be challenged on specific points (Weinstein et al., 1978) . The Georges' jargon-free style (applauded even by Weinstein, Anderson and Link, 1978) and their historical rigor (among psychobiographers at least-they do not consider themselves full-fledged historians) have no doubt contributed significantly to the resiliency of the work.
9For general discussions of the question of progress in psychobiography and psychohistory, Runyan, 1982; 1988a; 1988b; and Strozier & Offer, 1985, are all useful. Obviously, this issue is particularly acute for nonhistorians practicing psychohistory. It should also be noted, however, that even within historical study, "The issue of subjectivity in history is an old one . . . [and] historians who have been critical of the inferential leaps characteristic of psychoanalysis and psychohistory have failed to observe how vulnerable to this kind of criticism any history is that acquires depth and force by the interpretation of subjectivity..." (F. Weinstein, 1988, p. 168) . And Strozier and Offer add that "Usually historians make extraordinary leaps of psychological intuition without the slightest quiver, while simultaneously holding psychohistorians to the strictest standards of empirical validation for any statement of motivation" (1985, p. 62) .
Thus, psychobiography is dealing with fundamental problems of subjectivity and interpretation that bedevil history and other social sciences as well. It has most often faltered on these issues on methodological grounds, but this problem is diminishing as psychobiography has become more sophisticated. At this point, then, the weaknesses of psychobiography may well become less apparent than its strengths. For instance, the issue of countertransference, so well examined in its clinical dimension, may be considered in the context of biography as well (e.g., George & George, 1964 Erikson, 1958; 1975; Bushman, 1981 .) Applied to Wilson, it would undoubtedly begin with the ways in which his moralistic solution to his psychological problems resonated with the "historical moment" (as Erikson would put it) of progressivism, in domestic politics, and idealism, in foreign affairs (cf. George & George, 1956, p. 320). Also potentially relevant here are Lifton's innovative approaches to studying leaders and groups involved in shared historical "themes" (e.g., Lifton, 1986) . In this area, psychobiography and broader psychohistory intersect in a theoretical domain that has only been tentatively outlined and that has potential implications for history as well.
Psychological Theory and Psychobiography
Turning to the psychological wing of psychobiography, it is not surprising that some of the greatest limitations of WWCH are those that reflect the theoretical limitations of psychoanalysis itself, especially the psychoanalysis of the time when the book was written-although the careful use of a "shallow" approach has minimized the consequences. For example, it is indicative of the state of psychodynamic theory, especially then but even now, that Wilson's neurotic difficulties are much more amenable to rich analysis than are his psychological strengths. That is, while most of the psychobiographies acknowledge that Wilson internalized strengths as well as weaknesses from his parents, not much more seems able to be said (e.g., George & George, 1964 new theory, to add to our picture of him in important ways. As we have seen, the process raises a variety of theoretical issues about the psychobiographical endeavor, including that of choosing theoretical perspectives, comparing one to another, and possible problems in applying to a historical figure personality constructs that may be most applicable to contemporary character types. Furthermore, if this literature illustrates that developments in psychological theory will lead to developments in psychobiography, it also suggests that psychobiography is one of the better forums in which to argue out theoretical disputes of psychological theory per se. That is, in certain respects, there are advantages for theory development, and not just theory application, to discussing alternative interpretations of a public figure (cf. Carlson, 1988 ). For instance, while the clinician does have greater access to a subject's unconscious, the psychobiographer is able to consider an entire life history, and, data permitting, from a variety of perspectives (cf. Runyan, 1982 The differences in purpose and context of the psychobiographical, as opposed to the clinical, endeavor also make it a potentially helpful partner to clinical experience and data in psychodynamic theory development. For in a clinical setting, psychological healing is the primary consideration, while comprehension, in a very real sense, is secondary. (Ask any clinician whether it is preferable to see good therapeutic results without crystal clarity of diagnosis or whether it is preferable to have virtual diagnostic certainty and no therapeutic progress, and you will see what I mean). In contrast, the sole purpose of psychobiography is comprehension. Quite possibly this is one of the reasons that the Georges have recently commented that "it is our impression that written versions of psychodynamic theories generally do not yet explicate very well the methods sophisticated clinicians use to assess hypotheses in the therapeutic setting. As a result, political scientists and historians who attempt to apply psychodynamic theories to biography get very little help from the psychological literature itself as to how to make responsible, disciplined use of the theory for purposes of assessing the hypotheses it (all too) easily generates for their use" (George & George, 1989b, p. 6; this recognition of the complexity of psychological assessment is in contrast to the more confident tone the Georges convey on this issue in their preface to the 1964 edition of WWCH.) Thus, in addition to the oft-noted disadvantages of not having "analytic" contact with a subject, there are advan-tages as well not only for psychobiography, but for the development of psychological theory as well.
In conclusion, the psychobiographical literature on Wilson provides a rich source of material to draw upon in considering the state, and potential, of political psychobiography. It raises productive questions not only for Wilson scholarship and for psychobiography, but for history and psychology as well. Furthermore, in light of the current "interpretive turn" in the social sciences, this body of qualitative, interpretive, and sophisticated literature might well be instructive to many beyond these more obviously "implicated" disciplines. As to the legacy of the Georges' book itself, that it still sparks dispute and still instructs is impressive indeed.
